COLUMN: INIT
Incentives and Gamification
By Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gustavo F. Tondello, September 2017
By Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gustavo F. Tondello, September 2017
Online markets and platforms rely on human user decisions as inputs. This generates the challenge of managing user incentives and misbehaviors as strategic entities. Surprisingly, one can show that designers do not require much additional computational power to overcome this challenge.
By Rad Niazadeh, September 2017
Spliddit.org is a not-for-profit academic endeavor with the mission to provide free access to sophisticated and provably fair methods developed in the scientific community. Spliddit has been a major driving force for novel theoretical and empirical fair division research.
By Nisarg Shah, September 2017
Online auctions and other computational strategic systems where human users interact are usually analyzed based on the assumptions that the users are rational and reach an equilibrium. This article shows that these modeling assumptions lead to significant errors, and that using behaviorally appropriate assumptions is important for achieving credible predictions in such systems.
By Gali Noti, September 2017
Differential privacy guarantees the input data from a single individual has a very small impact on the output of a computation. Tools from privacy can also be used in game theory and economics to incentivize people to truthfully reveal their data.
By Rachel Cummings, September 2017
As self-interested individuals make decisions over time, they utilize information revealed by others in the past and produce information that may help others in the future. So how can we incentivize exploration for the sake of the common good?
By Aleksandrs Slivkins, September 2017
Crowdsourcing gives us a way to leverage the complementary strengths of humans and machines. But how do we solve the problem of low-quality crowdwork?
By Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, September 2017
By Caio Camargo, December 2006
By Ana Gil, Francisco García, December 2003
By Zoran Constantinescu, Pavel Petrovic, December 2002
By Dipanjan Chakraborty, Harry Chen, December 2000
Electronic commerce faces the problem of signing electronic contracts. Three approaches for handling electronic contracts include 1) no trusted third party protocols, 2) strongly-trusted third party protocols and 3) weakly-trusted third party protocols. A secondary problem facing electronic commerce is self-enforcing contract design.
By David Molnar, September 2000
By Michael Nelte, Elton Saul, September 2000
By Pradosh Kumar Mohapatra, September 2000
By Norbert J. Kubilus, September 2000
By Theodore Chiasson, Carrie Gates, September 2000